

Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in Democracies

**A Monograph
by
MAJ Brandy M. Andrews
United States Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Brandy M. Andrews

Title of Monograph: Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in Democracies

Approved by:

Michael Mosser, Ph.D.

Monograph Director

Stefan J. Banach, COL, IN

Director,
School of Advanced
Military Studies

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

Director,
Graduate Degree
Programs

Abstract

Civil-Military relations are an area of study that garners intense scrutiny. Since Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz first introduced their theories on civil-military relations, many scholars have debated the issue. Over the years, many alternative theories have been explored. A study of civil-military relations has been conducted on almost every nation in the world, some more than once. Of all the research available on civil-military relations, there still exists a shortfall in criteria that can be used to assist developing democracies in determining the evolution of their own civil-military relations. As nations continue to evolve, so too will their civil-military relations.

This monograph attempts to bridge the shortfall in areas of civil-military relations that will help a developing nation in improving its own civil-military relations. It will also be helpful to those organizations that may find themselves in a position to assist democracies in developing their civil-military relations.

In the study, four criteria are identified that apply to civil-military relations in democracies. These criteria have been applied to two case studies that show how the application of the criteria shows distinct patterns of development for civil-military relations. These criteria are the establishment of founding documents that specifically dictate civilian control over the military; the professional development of the military forces; the relationship of the civilian government and the military during times of war and peace; and the work-shirk attitude of the military. These criteria relate directly to different areas of civil-military relations where outside organizations may have the influence to provide guidance and advice to newly emerging democracies. Specifically this study may assist MNSTC-I and CSTC-A in the current fight, by helping both Iraq and Afghanistan develop a positive relationship between the government and the military.

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Introduction

Research and studies about civil-military research is abundant. There have been studies conducted on almost every nation in the world. These studies range from the United States, China, Russia, and everything in between. Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz are considered the two premier authors on the theory of civil-military relations. Other theories have developed either to fill in perceived shortcomings of the original concepts of Huntington and Janowitz or to provide alternatives to the original theories. Some of these alternative theories include Peter Feaver's agent theory, Rebecca Schiff's concordance theory, and Eliot Cohen's theory of unequal dialogue.

The why and how of civil-military relations remain nebulas. Previous research has not clearly identified whether there are identifiable criteria that shapes civil-military relations in a democracy. Democracies are appearing all over the world at an ever-increasing rate. Two prime examples that continue to make the daily news are Iraq and Afghanistan. These two nations are transforming from authoritarian regimes to a governmental form of democracy. A key area of study within democracies is civil-military relations. If criteria that shapes civil-military relations can be identified, then newly emerging democratic governments can actively learn from the history of mature democracies. These criteria could be beneficial for the development of civil-military relations in emerging democracies.

The study of civil-military relations often focuses exclusively on either the civilians or the military. There are many studies on the civil-military relations of individual nations and even comparisons of multiple nations. Studies often focus on one or two aspects of civil-military relations. Not many studies, however, focus on potential criteria for identifying what affects the interaction between the civilian government and the military, or even what elements are necessary for civil-military relations in democracies.

Through the study of civil military theories, this paper will show that criteria common to all theories can be identified. Emerging democratic nations can use these criteria in the

establishment of their own civil-military relations. By using these theories, there are four identifiable criteria that shape civil-military relations in democracies. These four criteria are the founding documents set the baseline for civilian control over the military; the degree of professionalism of the military will affect civil-military relations; the interaction between the civilian government and the military is different between times of peace and war; and the military will “work” or “shirk” based upon how divergent its views are compared to the views of the civilian government. Emerging democracies can use these criteria and the histories of mature democracies to develop their own civil-military relations and in the process avoid some of the errors that were made.

This paper is organized into four sections. Section one explains the theories of civil-military relations, to specifically include the theories of Huntington, Janowitz, Cohen, Schiff, and Feaver. For the purpose of this study however, only the theories of Huntington, Janowitz, Cohen, and Feaver will be used. Both Huntington’s and Janowitz’s theories set the basis for most civil-military relations theories. Cohen’s theory describes the difference in relations specifically during times of war and peace. Both Schiff and Feaver describe alternative theories, however, to maintain the theme of separation between the military and civilians Feaver’s theory will be used in the study. Section two will be a case study of the United States from the American Revolution to the Civil War. The case study is a historical look at the first 100 years of United States civil-military relations. There are a number of reasons for using the United States as a case study. First, this case study covers a period of intense evolution for the civil-military relations of the nation. Second is that the United States is a federal republic with democratic tendencies. With a couple of exceptions, the United States has spent a relatively large amount of its civil-military relations in a time of peace. Finally, geographically speaking, the United States has almost an entire continent to itself. Section three will be a case study of Israel from 1948 to present. The evolution of civil-military relations during the time of the case study is a relative contrast to the United States. The first reason for using Israel as a case study is that it has had a shorter period in

which its civil-military relations have evolved. Second, Israel shows the development of civil-military relations in a different type of democracy, specifically a parliamentary democracy. Finally, Israel has lived in a relatively suspended warlike state. Israel shares a continent with a majority of Arab nations that would prefer to have Israel erased from the world. In 2005, Iran's president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called for Israel to be "wiped off the Map."¹ Israel is a democratic nation in a typically non-democratic region. Both case studies will show how each of the four criteria are supported. The final section will bring together the results found within the case studies. It will also discuss how newly emerging democracies can learn from the lessons of mature democracies to develop their own civil-military relations.

Civil-Military Theory

According to Richard Kohn, the requirements for civilian control in a democracy are the rule of law, a stable method for succession, workable practices for electing officials, and a government and governing process accepted as legitimate by elites and by the population as a whole.² There are a number of theories established about civil-military relations. These theories include, but are not limited to, Samuel Huntington's theory on subjective versus objective civilian control, Peter Feaver's agency theory, Rebecca Schiff's concordance theory, Eliot Cohen's unequaled dialogue, and Morris Janowitz's theory of a citizen soldier-based constabulary force. Specifically this paper will focus on four theorists of civil-military relations, Huntington, Janowitz, Cohen, and Feaver. These theories move from the idea of what civil-military relations should be to how civil-military relations actually work.

¹ "Ahmadinejad: Israel must be wiped off the map," Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, October 26, 2005, http://web.archive.org/web/20070927213903/http://www.iribnews.ir/Full_en.asp?news_id=200247 (accessed October 19, 2008)

² Richard H. Kohn, "An Essay on Civilian Control of the Military," (essay, University North Carolina, 1997)

In his seminal work *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington, stated the principal focus of civil-military relations is the relation of the officer corps to the state.³ Huntington's theory of civil-military relations centers on the concept of officership as a profession. Huntington describes the professionalism of the officer corps as a characteristic used in the same sense as that of a physician or a lawyer.⁴ He identifies three distinct characteristics of professionalism. These characteristics are expertise, responsibility, and corporateness, specifically within the officer ranks.⁵ Expertise for the military officer is defined as the "direction, operation, and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence is the peculiar skill of the officer".⁶ The principal responsibility of the officer "to the state is the responsibility of the expert advisor."⁷ The officer corps maintains corporateness through it having restricted entrance, requiring education and training and by being "both a bureaucratic profession and a bureaucratic organization."⁸

Huntington describes two types of control: subjective civilian control and objective civilian control. Subjective civilian control focuses on maximizing civilian power, which means the maximizing of power of a particular civilian group or groups.⁹ It is Huntington's assertion that in the absence of a professional officer corps, the only form of civilian control possible is that of subjective control.¹⁰ Objective civilian control focuses on maximizing military professionalism. Whereas subjective civilian control civilianizes the military to achieve its ends, objective civilian control achieves its ends by militarizing the military, making it the tool of the

³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1959), 3.

⁴ Huntington, 7. Huntington identifies a profession as a peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics. Military professionalism would be defined those specialized characteristics specific to the military. For example, one specialized skill is the management of violence.

⁵ Huntington, 8-10.

⁶ Huntington, 11.

⁷ Huntington, 16.

⁸ Huntington, 16.

⁹ Huntington, 80.

¹⁰ Huntington, 81.

state.¹¹ Huntington describes it as “that distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of the officer corps”.¹² In essence, the goal of objective control is to ensure that the military is as effective as possible while minimizing the amount of influence that the military has on politics. Huntington believes that maximizing objective civilian control is the best way to achieve effective civil-military relations.

Huntington believes that professionalism of the officer corps is essential to civil-military relations and objective civilian control is the most effective form of control over the military. Huntington uses Germany, Japan, and the United States as case studies to prove his theory about civil-military relations. The Germany case study shows how changes in the national environment can destroy a high degree of objective civilian control and military professionalism. The Japan case study shows how as military influence increases in politics, it undermines the civilian government’s authority. Huntington argues that the Constitution of the United States provides for subjective civilian control, not objective civilian control, and objective civilian control exists despite the constitution.¹³ These case studies show what happens when both professionalism of the officer corps and objective control are not present within a nation’s civil-military relations. Both professionalism and objective control are necessary to have effective civilian control.

While Huntington looks at civil-military relations from the perspective of a political scientist, Janowitz looks at civil-military relations from the perspective of a sociologist. Both agree that professionalism is important to civil-military relations. While Huntington maintains that being apolitical is the key to a professional military, Janowitz argues that making the military more like a constabulary force and integrating the military with society is more effective.¹⁴

¹¹ Huntington, 83.

¹² Huntington, 83.

¹³ Huntington, 163.

¹⁴ Sam C. Sarkesian, “Two Conceptions of Military Professionalism,” in *The Military, Militarism, and The Polity*, ed. Michel Louis Martin and Ellen Stern McCrate (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 156.

Huntington's theory bases effective civilian control on the establishment of objective civilian control. Objective control is obtained by maximizing the power of the military through professionalism and political distance of the officer corps. For Huntington, the conduct of civil-military relations is not subject to whether there is peace or war, but to the compatibility between the ideology of the society and the professional military ethic.¹⁵ In Huntington's theory, the military will work or shirk based upon whether there is a conflict between doing what the civilian government wants and what the military professional believes to be true. Huntington refers to this as military obedience versus professional competence.¹⁶

In his book *The Professional Soldier*, Morris Janowitz focuses his study specifically on the professional life, organizational settings, and leadership of the American military. Through his research, Janowitz identified a "blurring of the distinction between the civilian and the military" due to technological innovations.¹⁷ Janowitz saw the military and civilian occupational categories losing their distinctiveness and becoming more similar. In order to maintain the skills necessary to meet the needs of advances in technology, the military becomes more civilianized. The civilians, however, do not have any greater understanding of the military than before. Janowitz also states that the officers' outlook on civil-military relations is directly linked to the professional experiences they have and personal attachments they form as a result of their service.¹⁸ He believes that the professional soldier should be "above politics," though this is not always reality.¹⁹ He asserts that in order to continue to be a professional force and meet the dilemmas of the future, the military must transform to a constabulary force.²⁰ This theory is

¹⁵ Huntington, 94.

¹⁶ Huntington, 74-75.

¹⁷ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), 31-32.

¹⁸ Janowitz, 300.

¹⁹ Janowitz, 233. "Above politics" means that in generals and admirals do not attach themselves to political parties or overtly display partisanship.

²⁰ Janowitz, 418. The constabulary force is that military establishment that is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than

based on the idea that the military will be "amenable to civilian political control because he (the officer) recognizes that civilians appreciate and understand the tasks and responsibilities of the constabulary force."²¹ With a constabulary force, Janowitz also believes the distinction between the military force and how the civilian government deals with the military in peacetime and wartime will disappear.²²

Janowitz focuses most of his study not specifically on civil-military relations in democracies, but on the study of the American military. His study centers on the sociological aspects of the military and indirectly on civil-military relations. He uses the American military as a case study to support his concept of a constabulary force. Janowitz discusses how changes in technology affect the military, how militaries respond to these changes, and their effects on civil-military relations. He states that these changes make the military more civilianized, but do not make the civilians more militarized.²³ Janowitz recognizes that there are challenges for the military in trying to remain outside of the political arena, but still reinforces the necessity for the military to try stay out of politics. The way for the military to adjust to the dilemmas of advanced technology and to avoid undue participation in politics is to transform to the constabulary force. This constabulary force would initially be built on the system of citizen soldier and eventually merge with professional service.²⁴ The constabulary force will allow the military to maintain its professionalism and integrate more with the civilian populace.

Janowitz provides a parallel theory to that of Huntington. Where Huntington maintains that to keep the military professional it should remain outside society, Janowitz believes that the military and society should be integrated to ensure better civil-military relations. This is a more

victory. The constabulary force concept covers the entire range of military power and organization, from weapons of mass destruction to military aid programs and guerilla and counter guerilla warfare.

²¹ Janowitz, 440.

²² Janowitz, 419.

²³ Janowitz, 31.

²⁴ Janowitz, 422.

subjective view of civil control, as described by Huntington. Janowitz's belief that the blurring of lines between the military and the civilians runs counter to Huntington's belief that the military should remain separate and autonomous from the civilians in order to maintain its professional integrity. Both theorists, however, agree that the military must maintain its professionalism. The difference is in how the professionalism is maintained, either through continued separation of the military and civilians or through integration. Janowitz's constabulary force would also negate the need for a distinction between wartime and peacetime interactions.²⁵ The officer in this constabulary force would also have a greater understanding of the civilian government's desires, therefore diminishing the distinction between a working or shirking attitude.

Eliot Cohen discusses the concept of civil-military relations during wartime. In his book *The Soldier and the Statesman*, Cohen describes Huntington's theory of objective control as the "normal" theory.²⁶ Cohen makes the analogy of a surgeon-patient relationship to describe how the civilian government and the military interact. The officers are akin to the highly trained surgeon and the statesman is the patient requiring urgent care.²⁷ The patient decides whether to have surgery or not, but does not tell the surgeon how to conduct the operation. This concept leads to a limited degree of civilian control over military matters.²⁸ Cohen uses four examples to show tensions in the "normal" theory of civil-military relations resulting from the interactions of the senior military officials and the civilian government during times of war. These four examples range from depoliticizing the military to finding a general who would succeed in meeting the strategic goals set. Each one shows different areas in which the "normal" theory of civil-military relations has problems within a wartime environment. Cohen argues that the

²⁵ Janowitz, 419.

²⁶ Eliot Cohen, *Supreme Command* (New York: The Free Press, 2002), 4.

²⁷ Cohen, 4.

²⁸ Cohen, 4.

“normal” theory goes astray with its “insistence on a *principled*, as opposed to a *prudential* basis for civilian restraint in interrogating, probing, and even in extremis, dictating military action.”²⁹

As an alternative to the “normal” theory of civil-military relations, Cohen proposes one of unequal dialogue. He argues that this theory differs from the “normal” theory in that the dialogue between the civilian leader and the military is unequal in that “both sides expressed their views bluntly … and not once but repeatedly.”³⁰ This unequaled dialogue was conducted throughout the conflict. Even though this dialogue existed between the civilian government and the military, the civilian government still exerted a significant amount of control over the military in every case. Cohen argues that there is no “arbitrary line separating the civil from the military in national security decision making; rather, the line shifts back and forth depending on the situation.”³¹

The theory of unequaled dialogue takes Huntington’s theory of objective control and applies it to times of war. This theory argues that the interaction between times of war and peace are different. During times of war, there is greater dialogue between the civilian government and the military. Cohen asserts the dialogue is unequal in that the civilian authority does not diminish in the face of war, but remains “unambiguous and unquestioned” and in some cases is stronger at the end of the war than at the beginning.³² Cohen believes this clears up some of the issues that the “normal” theory does not cover and makes for a more comprehensive study of wartime civil-military relations.

Cohen takes the basic premises of Huntington’s theory of objective control one step farther and applies it to the interactions that happen between the military and the civilian

²⁹ Cohen, 13. Principled is defined as based on, marked by, or manifesting principle according to The American Heritage College dictionary third edition. Prudential is defined as exercising prudence, good judgment, or common sense.

³⁰ Cohen, 209.

³¹ Dale Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 11.

³² Cohen, 209.

government during times of war. He agrees with the premise of objective control and that the military is professional. Cohen argues however, that objective control does not specifically address the change in dialogue when war occurs. What happens when war occurs is a change in the interaction between the civilian government and the military. The civilian government is more involved in military affairs. As Cohen writes, the civilian government takes military advice as advice and not as a course of action.³³ The military works or shirks based upon the orders the civilian government gives. If the orders are similar to what the military wants to do, then the military works; if the orders are different than what the military wants to do, the military will shirk, or go about following the orders in a slow or altered manner.

Peter Feaver proposes an alternative theory of civil-military relations to that of the Huntington or Janowitz theories. This theory is derived from the principal-agent framework. The principal-agent framework draws upon two features: strategic interaction and hierarchy. Strategic interaction exists “because the choices civilians make are contingent on their expectations of what the military is likely to do and vice versa.”³⁴ Hierarchy exists “because civilians enjoy the privileged position; civilians have legitimate authority over the military, whatever their de facto ability to control the military may be.”³⁵ The basic idea behind Feaver’s agent theory as described in his book, *Armed Servants*, is that there is a working and shirking relationship between the employer (principal) and the worker (agent).³⁶ The principal wants a diligent worker

³³ Cohen, 209.

³⁴ Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 54.

³⁵ Feaver, 54. The civilians that Feaver refers to are those civilian in a position of leadership within the government, normally the president, prime minister, etc. Legitimate authority exists through a constitutional basis, founding documents or other laws as established by the civilian government and recognized by all, military and civilian alike.

³⁶ Feaver, 3.

who will do what he is supposed to be doing instead of something else. The agent wants to be hired and therefore needs to appear diligent.³⁷

Applied to civil-military relations, the principal is the civilian government and the agent is the military. Feaver defines working as “doing something to the principal’s satisfaction”, while shirking means “not doing something to the principal’s satisfaction.”³⁸ There are two ways in which the military will work. The first way is that the work required by the civilian government is in agreement with what the military feels that it should do. The second way is the military will do the work required by the civilian government so long as it feels that it is being watched by the civilian government or that it will be punished if caught not working.³⁹ The military will have a tendency to shirk if the military does not agree with how the civilian government wants the work done and will seek to manipulate the situation in order to get its way.⁴⁰ Feaver provides the agent theory as a way answer the question of how civil-military relations are played out on a day-to-day basis. His study specifically focuses on the United States, but can be applied across a spectrum of governments.

Feaver develops a theory of civil-military relations as an alternative to Huntington’s theory. He argues that while Huntington and Janowitz provide important literature to the area of civil-military relations, there has been little progress in the area since Janowitz’s alternative theory was presented. Feaver’s agency theory focuses on how civil-military relations are on a day-to-day basis, where as Huntington and Janowitz describe in theory how civil-military relations should look. Feaver intrinsically links civil-military relations with democracy. He identifies civil-military relations as the “heart of a central concern of democracy.”⁴¹ Feaver states

³⁷ Feaver, 55.

³⁸ Feaver, 60.

³⁹ Feaver, 3.

⁴⁰ Feaver, 57.

⁴¹ Feaver, 4.

that “understanding how civilians exercise control… is central to the democratic enterprise.”⁴² In principal, Feaver agrees with Huntington and Janowitz about the need for civil control over the military. He makes the assumption that the military is professional. Where Feaver diverges from Huntington and Janowitz is in the how the civilians control the military and what the military does about it. Feaver argues there is always a work-shirk relationship between the military and the civilian government, which can appear to be more prevalent during times of war versus peace.

Rebecca Schiff’s concordance theory is another alternative to looking at civil-military relations. The concordance theory argues that “three partners — the military, the political elites, and the citizenry — should aim for a cooperative relationship that may or may not involve separation but does not require it.”⁴³ The theory explains that there are four indicators that the three partners must work to agree on. These indicators are the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style.⁴⁴ In using the concordance theory, Schiff argues that it explains the institutional and cultural conditions affecting the relations among the three partners and that if the partners agree on the four indicators, the military is less likely to intervene in domestic matters.⁴⁵

The theory of concordance is different from current civil-military theories in that it does not necessarily require the separation of the civilians and the military; instead, it focuses on the nation’s cultural tendencies as shown by historic examples.⁴⁶ The concordance theory uses cultural tendencies to determine the potential of the three partners to agree on the four indicators. It does not require a specific type of government, set of institutions, or decision-making

⁴² Feaver, 2.

⁴³ Rebecca Schiff, “Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance,” *Armed Forces and Society* 22 no. 1 (Fall 1995), 7. Rebecca Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*, (New York: Routledge, 2008). The theory of concordance has been expanded upon in the author’s book.

⁴⁴ Schiff, “Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered,” 8.

⁴⁵ Schiff, “Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered,” 12.

⁴⁶ Schiff, “Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered,” 8.

processes.⁴⁷ This theory is similar to Janowitz's theory of civil-military relations in that both theories look at civil-military relations from the perspective of how the military and the civilians interact on a social level. The key difference is that the concordance theory does not require the separation of the civil and military institutions.

Below is a brief summary of the five theories studied: Huntington, Janowitz, Cohen, Schiff and Feaver. Huntington, Cohen, Schiff and Feaver all have backgrounds in political science, Janowitz's background is in sociology. Huntington's theory is that in democracies, civil-military relations are maintained with a professional army that the civilian government controls through objective means.⁴⁸ Janowitz, on the other hand, believes that increases in technology have blurred the lines between the civilians and the military, and that more closely integrating the military and civilians while still maintaining a professional force that works more as a constabulary force better serve civil-military relations in a democracy.⁴⁹ Cohen takes an alternative view to both Huntington and Janowitz in that he believes that there is the normal civil-military relations environment, specifically peace and then there is the abnormal state of civil-military relations environment that is war. Cohen believes that Huntington and Janowitz fail to address this abnormal state of civil-military relations and creates a supplemental theory called the "unequaled dialogue that specifically addresses the abnormal state of civil-military relations."⁵⁰ Schiff provides an alternative to the civil-military theories in that she argues that three actors, the military, the political elites, and the citizenry must come to agreement on four indicators to determine civil-military relations.⁵¹ Her theory is different from the others in that the concordance theory does not require the separation between the civil and the military. Feaver believes that a new approach to civil-military relations is necessary to explain the daily

⁴⁷ Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered," 12.

⁴⁸ Huntington, 80-85.

⁴⁹ Janowitz, 418-419.

⁵⁰ Cohen, 209.

⁵¹ Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered," 8.

relationship between the civilian government and the military. He developed the agent theory based upon the principal-agent framework. This theory states that there is a work-shirk relationship between the civilian government and the military.⁵² Within the relationship, the military will work or shirk based upon the compatibility of its desires to those of the civilian government. A working analogy is that Huntington and Janowitz are looking at the strategic level of civil-military relations, Cohen looks at the operational level of civil-military relations, and Schiff and Feaver looks at the operational/tactical level of civil-military relations.

In looking at how each of the theorists defines civil-military relations, there are four criteria that come out of the study of these theories. The first criterion is that in their founding documents, democracies appear to set the baseline for civilian control over the military. The second criterion is the degree of the professionalism of the military will affect civil-military relations. A third criterion is the interaction between the civilian government and the military is different between times of peace and war. The last criterion is the military will work or shirk based upon how divergent their views are compared to the views of the civilian government. Figure 1 below shows how the four theories are represented in respect to the four criteria identified.

⁵² Feaver, 3.

Criteria / Authors	Civilian control over the military	Professionalism of the military	Difference between peacetime and wartime civil-military relations	Work or shirk
Huntington	Objective control most beneficial to civil-military relations	Essential for civil-military relations	Assumes dialogue will be equal at all times because objective control maximizes military force while maintaining civilian control	Based upon the tensions between military and civilian desires
Janowitz	Subjective control ; self-imposed professional standards and meaningful integration with civilian values	Essential for civil-military relations	Constabulary force will eliminate the need for a distinction between peacetime and wartime interaction	Increased civilianization of the military will caused tension between the military and the civilian government
Cohen	Objective control with a more subjective approach during war.	Essential for civil-military relations	Relations are more strained during times of war, more civilian influence	Dependent upon the what the requirements are based upon military desires
Feaver	Objective control	Essential for civil-military relations	Recognizes difference in the relations	Will work or shirk based upon chance of getting caught

Figure 1

Case Study: United States from the Revolutionary War to the Civil War

Throughout its history, the United States has struggled with determining the right amount of civilian control over the military. The United States has transformed from a nation that detested the idea of a standing military to one that takes pride in the professionalism of the men and women serving in the military. This transformation, however, has not been easy. Many colonists distrusted a standing military. Only after a number of wars and years had passed did the belief in a standing professional military come about. This case study shows how the four criteria identified in the civil-military theory section are represented in the first 100 years of the history of United States.

Founding Documents' Influence on Civil-Military Relations

The United States' form of democracy is that of a constitution-based federal republic. It is normally associated with a presidential democracy, which is defined as “a system of government where the executive branch exists separately from a legislature (to which it is generally not accountable).”⁵³ The United States has struggled with the idea of civilian control of the military since its founding. The very structure in which the founding fathers formed the government portrayed their distrust of a military without civilian oversight. The country’s founding fathers still had fresh in their memory military repression under English rule.⁵⁴ In Federalist Paper 26, Alexander Hamilton addressed the fear of repression by a strong standing military when he wrote the American people “may be said to have derived a hereditary impression of the danger to liberty from standing armies in time of peace.”⁵⁵ As a result of these fears, the framers of the Constitution created two aspects of civilian control over the military. These two aspects are the clear subordination of the military to the civilian authority, and the divided control of the military between the executive and legislative branches of the government. Article I, section 8 of the constitution gives the Congress the right to provide for the common defense. Some of the powers that Congress was given are

- To declare war
- To raise and support armies
- To provide and maintain a navy
- To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces,
- To provide for calling forth the militia to execute that laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions,
- To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States.⁵⁶

⁵³ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html#2128> (accessed September 25, 2008)

⁵⁴ The Honorable I. Lewis Libby, “American Perspective on Civil-military relations and democracy,” The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/HL433.cfm> (accessed October 20, 2008)

⁵⁵ Alexander Hamilton, “The Federalist No. 26,” *The Federalist Papers*, ed. Garry Wills (New York: Bantam Books, 1982). 126-127.

⁵⁶ U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8.

Article II, section 2 states that the “President shall be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States.”⁵⁷ Additionally the second and third amendments to the constitution provide for additional stipulations upon the military. The second amendment states, “a well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”⁵⁸ The third amendment states, “no soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”⁵⁹ The forefathers of the United States ensured that any military within the country would fall under the direct control of the civilian government, whether that is the federal or state government.

Professionalism of the Military

When the framers were drafting the constitution the idea of military professionalism and objective civilian control were just beginning to take root. The concept was more that of a citizen-soldier. The state militias would form when the United States was threatened, and once the threat was over, the militia would disband until needed again. This idea is closer to that of Janowitz than Huntington in that the forefathers of the United States preferred militias versus a professional standing military. It would be a period of years before the idea of a professional military would gain strong support within the United States.

Huntington asserts that the emergence of military professionalism is a cornerstone of civil-military relations. He describes expertise, responsibility, and corporateness as three characteristics required for a military to be professional. The origins of military professionalism in the United States are rooted back to the late 1600s, when the colonial military forces “follow a

⁵⁷ U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2.

⁵⁸ U.S. Constitution, amend 2

⁵⁹ U.S. Constitution, amend 3.

parallel path through the gradual and largely unplanned evolution of “semi-professional” volunteer forces.”⁶⁰ Even though professionalism had roots prior to the American Revolution, the American people remembered the poor treatment from the British military and reacted to the idea of a standing military with distrust. The prevailing attitude in the early 1800s was that a large standing military was a threat to liberty, a threat to democracy, a threat to economic prosperity, and a threat to peace.⁶¹ The American people viewed the military as necessary evil to ensure security of the nation.

Early on, instead of a standing military, the civilian leaders believed that the United States should focus more toward having the state militia that would form up in time of need. Even though civilian leaders initially balked at the idea of a standing military, they understood the need to protect the nation. Responsibility was the first characteristic the United States would achieve. The responsibility of the United States military became the security of the nation. Eventually it would gain the permanent mission of preparing for war.⁶² With the responsibility of maintaining the security of the nation, the military would next start to gain a sense of corporateness. The first step to corporateness was the establishment of the Legion. According to William Skelton in his book *An American Profession of Arms*, the transformation of the regular army into a fully professional military occurred with the establishment of the Legion in the early 1790s.⁶³ The establishment of the Legion was another step to achieving a full time professional

⁶⁰ Samuel J. Watson, *Professionalism, Social Attitudes, and Civil-Military Accountability in the United States Army Officer Corps, 1815-1846* (Ann Arbor: UMI dissertation Services, 1996), 96.

⁶¹ Garry D. Ryan and Timothy K Nenninger, eds., *Soldiers and Civilians: The U.S. Army and the American People* (Washington, DC: National Archives Trust Fund Board, 1987), 19.

⁶² Matthew Moten, *The Delafield commission and the American Military Profession* (Ann Arbor: UMI Dissertation Services, 1997), 104. Secretary of War John C Calhoun was essential to the passing of law in 1821 that effectively gave the military a peace time mission.

⁶³ William Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861* (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1992), 39, 90. The Legion was formed in 1792. It was commanded by General Anthony Wayne and consisted of what was left of the army after the defeats of 1790 and 1791. General Wayne focused on discipline and adherence to the “details of military administration as established in the Articles of War and Baron von Steuben’s regulations.” He also instituted training programs oriented toward frontier combat.

military. Education of the military began when a school for the artillery and engineers was established in 1794.⁶⁴ Unfortunately, this school would receive little support from not only the civilians but also the military officers. President Jefferson called for the establishment of the United States Military Academy on 16 March 1802 as the first school for the professional education of military officers.⁶⁵ The United States Military Academy, later known as West Point, was the second attempt to establish a professional education system for military officers. It was during President Jackson's tenure that the United States Military Academy at West Point, originally established by President Jefferson as an engineering school, became the final component necessary to establishing an all-encompassing professional military. The United States Military Academy also contributed to the corporateness of the military in that it contributed to a corps of professionally educated officers. After the War of 1812 and during the Jacksonian era, the military continued to make great strides in becoming more professional. Some of the factors that assisted in the transition are excellent leaders emerged from the War of 1812, the army received a permanent mission: to prepare for war, and West Point became a school that provided a cohesive body of officers.⁶⁶ The military was on its way to becoming a highly professional force.

Dialogue During War and Peace

The perception during the early years of American history was, “the prevailing American view on the use of military force emphasized the distinction between war and peace.”⁶⁷ The only purpose for the military during peacetime was to prepare for when it was needed for war. The United States fought in 21 conflicts between the American Revolution and the Civil War. Of

⁶⁴ Watson, 233.

⁶⁵ Skelton, 98-99.

⁶⁶ Moten, 104.

⁶⁷ Andrew Goodpaster and Samuel Huntington, *Civil-Military Relations* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research), 17.

these 21 conflicts, four were major conflicts to include the American Revolution, the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, and the Civil War, plus multiple conflicts with the Indians.⁶⁸ The dislike of a standing military led the United States to have a clear distinction between war and peace. The founding fathers understood that if many people had control over the military dissension over how the military was to be employed would arise. To minimize the potential for dissension, they named the President as commander-in-chief of the army. This would give the military an overarching authority during times of peace and war.⁶⁹ As the commander-in-chief, the president would be able to set forth strategic guidance and have the military support this guidance without contradicting orders.

The disparity comes when the military feels that the civilian government has become too involved in the affairs of the military during times of war. The first example of this is in 1793 when General Wayne was told explicitly by the civilian government when and where to move supplies and men in the conflict against the Indians.⁷⁰ The explicit directions on how, when, and what to move during the conflict with the Indians shows significantly more input from the civilian government than would be shown in peacetime. This increased guidance from the civilian government impinged upon the military's ability to execute its duties. A prime example of how the civilian government and the military interact differently during times of war is President Lincoln dealing with his military commanders during the Civil War. President Lincoln appointed and fired multiple generals of the army until he found one that could meet his strategic goals; this was General Grant.⁷¹ President Lincoln developed his strategic vision for how the Civil War should proceed. What he initially lacked was a military general that shared in his

⁶⁸ <http://www.usahistory.com/frames.htm> (accessed September 26, 2008).

⁶⁹ Louis Smith, *American Democracy and Military Power: A Study of Civil Control of the Military Power in the United States* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), 48.

⁷⁰ Richard Kohn, *Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), 153-154.

⁷¹ Smith, 51.

vision and was capable of executing it. The dialogue that existed between the civilian government and the military was significantly different in times of peace and war.

During times of war, the government would call the military into action; during times of peace, the government would draw down the standing military. What was left was often neglected. President Jefferson viewed the military in times of peace as an organization to be used for civilian purposes.⁷² This concept of using the military for civilian purposes shows that there was a distinct difference between the interactions of the military during peace and war. During peacetime, the military was often ignored, and during times of war the civilian government provided oversight so as to not let the army become too estranged from its civilian masters.

Working or Shirking

Throughout the history of the United States, there are examples of how the military has chosen either to execute the orders of the civilian government as ordered or to manipulate the situations to its own satisfaction. Feaver describes this action by the military as either working or shirking. The Newburgh Conspiracy was an example of the military shirking. The common misconception about the Newburgh Conspiracy is that a number of military officers who voiced grievances over unpaid salary and the potential for not getting a promised pension, corroborated with some legislators to threaten a military coup.⁷³ Other scholars, however, believe that the Newburgh Conspiracy was not to engage in a military coup, but to pressure Congress into concessions about the unpaid salaries and pensions.⁷⁴ This pressuring of Congress shows the military's attempt to manipulate the situation to ensure a favorable outcome. In the case of the Newburgh Conspiracy, it was an attempt to pressure Congress into providing back pay and to

⁷² James Clotfelter, *The Military in American Politics* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1973), 14.

⁷³ Moten, 35-36.

⁷⁴ Skelton, 69. Richard H. Kohn, "The Inside History of the Newburgh Conspiracy: America and the Coup d'Etat," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 27, no. 2 (April 1970): 187.

uphold the officer pensions. Another example of military shirking shows how military officers will potentially openly defy civilian authority when they believe the results to not be in their best interest. During President Adams' tenure Brigadier General Winfield Scott openly defied the administration by refusing to serve under Alexander Macomb, refusing to recognize him as a superior and calling him a usurper.⁷⁵ General Scott had aspirations to serve as the senior general officer of the army. When he was not chosen for the position he tried to influence the civilian government's decision by openly protesting the assignment of another. President Adams' had a similar situation with Alexander Hamilton and his aspirations to be the inspector general of the army. From the viewpoint of the civilian government, an example of shirking is during the Mexican War when Congress felt that the military officers were procrastinating in executing their duties.⁷⁶ To resolve this issue, the Congress demanded a committee to check on the conduct of the war. This example shows how the civilian government can perceive the military to be shirking based upon what they believed needs to be done. This also shows how the civilian government can exact punishment based upon the perceived shirking.

The United States case study shows examples of where the four criteria were emphasized in the history of the United States. The development of civil-military relations in the United States is a continuous struggle between the military and the civilian government. How the two interact, what type of control should be used, and how much oversight should the civilian government have are just a few of the issues that civilian government has in relation to the military in the United States. As the United States continued to evolve so too did its civil-military relations. The Israel case study is distinctly different. Where the United States had times of peace and war, Israel considers itself to always be in conflict. The time period of development is also different. The United States covered about 100 years; Israel has done almost the same in 60 years.

⁷⁵ Skelton, 289.

⁷⁶ Smith, 193-194.

Case Study: Israel

Since its declaration of independence, Israel has been a nation at war. Being the only democracy in a non-democratic area does not assist in the security of the nation. The nation's belief that it is always in a state of war shapes the relationship between the military and the civilian government. This case study identifies how the criteria identified are represented in the civil-military relations of Israel. It is important to note that the civil-military relations of Israel contrast sharply with the civil-military relations of the United States.

Founding documents influence on civil-military relations

Israel operates under a parliamentary system of democracy and is currently the only western democracy that has been in a perpetual state of war since its inception.⁷⁷ As defined by the CIA World Fact Book, a parliamentary democracy is a political system in which the legislature (parliament) selects the government – a prime minister, premier, or chancellor, along with the cabinet ministers – according to party strength as expressed in elections. By this system, the government acquires a dual responsibility to the people as well as to the parliament.⁷⁸ A parliamentary democracy is characterized by no clear-cut separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches. Israel proclaimed its independence on 14 May 1948. Initially, the proclamation of Independence lay down that the elected Constituent Assembly would prepare a Constitution for the State of Israel no later than 1 October 1948.⁷⁹ When the Knesset failed to prepare a Constitution within the allotted time the Knesset agreed to the "Harari proposal". "The Harari proposal" was named after MK Yizhar Harari of the Progressive Party

⁷⁷ Yoram Peri, *Between Battles and Ballots* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1.

⁷⁸ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html#2128> (accessed September 25, 2008).

⁷⁹ http://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/asefa_eng.htm, (accessed October 20, 2008).

who proposed it.⁸⁰ This proposal allowed for a set of Basic Laws that would upon completion compromise a Constitution for Israel. Within these basic laws are the governing of the country, the governing of the military, and how they relate to one another. Currently there are 11 basic laws that cover the governing of Israel.⁸¹

Ben-Gurion, one of Israel's founding fathers, believed that "the overall management of military matters in a democracy ... should be in the hands of the democratically elected political authority."⁸² Ben-Gurion served as both the prime minister and defense minister for Israel for a period of almost 20 years, where he executed his belief that the military should be subordinate to the civilian government. Serving as both prime minister and defense minister was a contradiction to Ben-Gurion's beliefs. It was because of his personal beliefs about civil-military relations that allowed the situation to work. For Israel, Ben-Gurion's service as both the prime minister and defense minister at the same time was a unique event. There has not been another person who had served as both prime minister and defense minister since Ben-Gurion. Ben-Gurion's amount of time spent as prime minister and defense minister significantly impacted Israel's notion of civilian control over the military.⁸³ It was this period of time that cemented the idea that the military must be and is subordinate to the civilian government in whatever form. The one fault of Ben-Gurion was that he did not put into official law his beliefs that the military should be

⁸⁰ http://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mimshal_hoka.htm#4, (accessed October 20, 2008). The Harari proposal states that "the First Knesset assigns to the constitution, law, and justice committee the preparation of a proposed constitution for the state. The constitution would be made up of chapters, each of which will constitute a separate basic law. The chapters would be brought to the Knesset, as the committee completes its work, and all the chapters together will constitute the constitution of the state."

⁸¹ http://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/asefa_eng.htm, (accessed October 20, 2008). The Basic Laws cover The Knesset (1958), Israel Lands as Basic Law: The People's Lands (1960), the President of the State (1964), The State Economy (1975), The Army (1976), Jerusalem, the capital of Israel (1980), The Judiciary (1984), The State Comptroller (1988), Human Dignity and Liberty (1992), The Government (2001), and Freedom of Occupation (1994).

⁸² Udi Lebel, *Communicating Security: Civil-Military Relations in Israel* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 11.

⁸³ Yehuda Ben Meir, *Civil-Military Relations in Israel* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 88.

subordinate to the civilian government. This lack of a formalized law allowed leeway for the military to gain influence in traditional non-military arenas. It was not until almost 30 years after the founding of Israel that the Basic Law: The Army was passed by the Knesset in 1976 that officially put into law the subordination of the military to the civilian government. The Basic Law: the Army states,

“ The Defense Army of Israel is the army of the State. The Army is subject to the authority of the Government. The Minister in charge of the Army on behalf of the Government is the Minister of Defense. The supreme command level in the Army is the Chief of the General Staff. The Chief of the General Staff is subject to the authority of the Government and subordinate to the Minister of Defense. The Chief of the General Staff shall be appointed by the Government upon the recommendation of the Minister of Defense... No armed force other than the Defense Army of Israel shall be established or maintained except under Law.”⁸⁴

This law was intended to “define formally and explicitly Israel’s political-military relations.”⁸⁵

Due to the continuous level of conflict, the IDF has become both a symbol of national unity and a dominant force highly involved in almost all facets of Israeli life”⁸⁶ This constant conflict has also led to an increased amount of influence that the IDF has within the political realm. Even with an increased amount of influence, the IDF remains subordinate to the civilian government.

Professionalism of the Military

The professionalism of the Israeli military has roots back to the Zionist movement prior the declaration of Israel as a nation.⁸⁷ The Israeli military has made continuous efforts to ensure the professionalism of its military. In fact, the professionalism of the Israel Defense Force is a source of pride to all of Israel. Over time, the military has come to be seen as a profession in

⁸⁴ http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic11_eng.htm, (accessed October 20, 2008).

⁸⁵ Lebel, 1.

⁸⁶ Ben Meir, xi.

⁸⁷ Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 253.

which there is growth and increased potential for recognition.⁸⁸ Israel does not have the resources or people to maintain a large standing military. The solution is to have a small corps of regular military with highly trained senior officers and a well-developed reserve system.⁸⁹ This smaller military requires that the senior officers within the standing military be highly trained and professional at all times in order to ensure the proper application of the reserve forces when mobilized. The Israel Defense Force is composed of a combination of full time soldiers, conscripts, and reserve soldiers. All Jewish men and women are required to serve in the IDF at the age of 18. Men serve for a period of 3 years and women serve for a period of 21 months. After the mandatory service time is met, all men will serve in the reserves up to the age of 51 and women to the age of 24.⁹⁰ Even though service is only mandatory for Jewish men and women, all Israeli citizens may volunteer to serve in the IDF. If upon completion of mandatory service, an Israeli would like to continue serving actively in the IDF, they can sign up for career military service and become a career officer or NCO providing they meet the requirements.⁹¹ The limited amount of citizens of Israel is prohibitory in the nation having a very large standing military. To compensate for the limit of personnel the military has a very large reserve system. According to the Middle East Forces Database, Israel's population is 7.1 million. Of these, 621,500 people serve in the military (176,500 active duty and 445,000 reserve).⁹² This equates to almost 9% of the total population serving in the military, 2.5% serve on active duty alone.

Huntington uses the characteristics of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness to define the professionalism of the officer corps. The officers of the IDF attain expertise through training and education. The Israeli equivalent of the United States Command and General Staff

⁸⁸ Ben Meir, xvii.

⁸⁹ Ben Meir, 84.

⁹⁰ http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/IDF.html#1, (accessed October 20, 2008).

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² <http://www.inss.org.il/> under ME military forces under Israel (accessed October 20, 2008). This is a pdf file.

College is the National Defense College. The purpose of the National Defense College is to “develop excellence and professional skills in its students, who are designated to occupy senior positions in the IDF.”⁹³ Professional education and training is essential in that it is necessary to understand the situation and be able to provide the best advice possible to the civilian government when dealing with national security issues. The professionalism of senior military officers is based upon their day-to-day performance, with times of war being the ultimate test.⁹⁴ The second characteristic for a professional officer corps is responsibility. The IDF has a responsibility to the government and to the people of Israel to provide the security of the nation. The mission of the IDF is to “defend the existence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state of Israel. To protect the inhabitants of Israel and to combat all forms of terrorism which threaten the daily life.”⁹⁵ The senior officers of the IDF are responsible for providing professional and knowledgeable advice to the civilian government on matters of national security. The IDF also has a responsibility to the people in that Ben-Gurion believed that the army must also serve as an “educational and pioneering center for Israeli youth.”⁹⁶ The idea that the army should serve to educate the youth of Israel still stands as an IDF responsibility today. Corporateness is the third characteristic for a professional officer corps identified by Huntington. The IDF attains its corporate character through the officers who have been accepted to serve as part of the full-time central corps of the IDF. These officers have to meet the current IDF needs in order to become part of that central group.⁹⁷ The IDF shows all three characteristics of professionalism as

⁹³ http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/ndc.html, (accessed October 20, 2008).

⁹⁴ Moshe Lissak, ed., *Israeli Society and its Defense Establishment: The Social and Political Impact of a Protracted Violent Conflict* (Totowa: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1984), 1.

⁹⁵ <http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/about/doctrine/default.htm>, (accessed October 20, 2008).

⁹⁶ Amos Perlmutter, *Military and Politics in Israel: Nation-Building and Role Expansion* (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1969), 66.

⁹⁷ http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/IDF.html, (accessed October 20, 2008).

identified by Huntington. The strength of these characteristics has had its difficulties over the course of years, but overall the IDF has maintained a professional force since its inception.

Dialogue During War and Peace

Six days after Israel proclaimed its independence it was embroiled in its first war. Every since its formation, Israel has been in a perpetual state of conflict. According to Ben Meir, “it is impossible to differentiate between peacetime and wartime civil-military relations in Israel, inasmuch as the country finds itself in a virtually permanent condition of no peace and no war.⁹⁸ The constant military threat to the nation throughout its lifetime affects the everyday life of the people and is the primary cause of the increased military influence upon the civilian government of Israel. Israel accepts the fact that it will be in constant conflict as it judges the Arabs will never be amenable to its existence.⁹⁹

Israel has only two peace treaties with any of its Arab neighbors: Jordan and Egypt. The peace treaty with Egypt, signed in 1979, signaled the first Arab country to officially recognize Israel as a nation. The second treaty, with Jordan, was signed in 1994. The lack of peace treaties with its neighbors leads Israel to distinguish itself as having unstable peace and periods of all-out conflict instead of peace. During times of unstable peace, the IDF is working on ways in which to enable a more stable security environment and providing assistance to the civilian government in matters of national security and strategic planning. The civilian government also works differently with the military during periods of unstable peace versus conflict. During times of unstable peace, the civilian government provides more oversight to the military in terms of what the military does to prepare for war. One example of this is when Dayan became Minister of Defens, he became involved in not only the “what but also the how.”¹⁰⁰ Dayan was involved

⁹⁸ Ben Meir, 28.

⁹⁹ Peri, *Between Battles and Ballots*, 19.

¹⁰⁰ Peri, *Between Battles and Ballots*, 164.

in determining the composition and size of units along with the types of operations conducted and when. This example shows increasingly more input from the civilian government than at any other time. During times of conflict the civilian government generally defers to the guidance and execution of the military so long as the military does not act outside the strategic guidance that the civilian government has agreed upon. This hands-off approach during times of conflict is different than in times of unstable peace.

Working or Shirking

When determining whether the military will work or shirk, it is important to look at the relationship between the prime minister, the defense minister, and the chief of the general staff and at the military as an institution. According to Perlmutter, the military in Israel will act “as a pressure group similar to those in other non-praetorian states where the civilian is formally and informally supreme, and will continue to challenge the civilian, especially in the realm of defense and foreign affairs.”¹⁰¹ Because Israel is such a small nation, the strength or weakness of the relationship among the key actors of government is critical.¹⁰² The strength or weakness of these relationships can have significant results on how the IDF either works or shirks. When the relationship is strong between key personnel and the civilian government respects the fact that the IDF sees itself as the defender of Israel and listens to the opinions provided by the senior general officers there is a greater tendency for the military to work. When the relationship is negative and the civilian government marginalizes the advice of the military, the military tends to shirk. An example of a positive relationship is the one between Prime Minister Golda Meir and the minister of defense Dayan in what became informally known as “Golda’s Kitchen Cabinet.” This small forum comprised of Meir, deputy premier Allon, defense Minister Dayan, and minister without

¹⁰¹ Ben Meir, xvi.

¹⁰² Peri, *Between Battles and Ballots*, 103.

portfolio Galili. When there were national security issues the IDF chief of staff Elazar and director of AMAN Zeira were also included.¹⁰³

One example of the IDF shirking is just prior to the Six Day War when the military pressured the government into attacking the Egyptian forces.¹⁰⁴ At first glance, this would not appear to be shirking. However, the civilian government was not initially ready to go to war. The pressure the military put on the civilian government in order to get its way is one form of shirking. In this case, the military was trying to force the civilian government's hand in approving the military to attack the Egyptians prior to the civilian government being ready to accept that decision. Another example of shirking is senior officers going to the press to voice their discontent when there was a disagreement over the Clinton plan in December 2000.¹⁰⁵ Here the military disagreed with what the civilian government was doing. In order to show their disagreement with the civilian government, some of the officers went to the press in order to have that disagreement heard. This also acts as a forcing function for the civilian government. The civilian government will take some action in response to the officers going to the press.

The Israeli government identified the normal boundary between the civilian ministry of defense (MOD) and IDF with the concept that "the function of the IDF is to present what it needs within budgetary constraints, and the function of the MOD is to determine how the various needs will be met."¹⁰⁶ The IDF have over time gained a large amount of influence in areas outside its normal purview because of the amount of time the country has spent in conflict. Due to this increased influence, the military tends to shirk when the civilian government attempts to limit what the military does and the areas that the military influences. The areas in which the IDF has

¹⁰³ David Buckwalter, "The 1973 Arab-Israeli War." In *Case Studies in Policy Making and Process*. 10th ed. Policy Making and Process Faculty ed.. (Newport: Naval War College, 2007), 123. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/pmi/1973.pdf> (accessed October 19, 2008).

¹⁰⁴ Edward Bernard Glick, *Between Israel and Death* (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1974), 145.

¹⁰⁵ Yoram Peri, *Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), 105.

¹⁰⁶ Ben Meir, 88.

greater influence is budgeting, research & development, and procurement of equipment and resources.¹⁰⁷ The IDF also has influence on strategic development and defense policy in conjunction with the civilian government. When the civilian government tried to curb the amount of influence the military has in the areas of research and development and procurement, the military sees this as counter to the interests of the institution and therefore shirks.

Conclusion

Founding Document Influence Civil-Military Relations

Both the United States and Israel case studies show that the founding documents set the baseline for civilian control over the military. The manner in which each government established civilian control and the level of control over the military are different for each nation. Both nations understand the importance of establishing firm civilian control over the military to lessen the potential for an attempt at a military coup. The repression of the British military instilled a strong distrust of standing armies in the founders of the United States.¹⁰⁸ For the United States case study, the distrust the founding fathers had for a strong military was the basis for the laws established within the Constitution to ensure civilian control over the military and to limit its power. Stipulations as to the amount of control the civilian government had over the military was directly written into the Constitution.¹⁰⁹ This level of control over the military was based upon the idea that the military was necessary in order to provide for the security of the United States.

The Israeli case study also firmly supports the idea that democracies require a level of civilian control over the military. Defense Ordinance No. 4 initially establishes the IDF and requires the officers and soldiers to swear allegiance to the state of Israel and its authorities but does not specifically subordinate the military to the civilian government. One of the founding

¹⁰⁷ Ben Meir, 89.

¹⁰⁸ The Honorable I. Lewis Libby, "American Perspective on Civil-military relations and democracy," The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/HL433.cfm> (accessed October 20, 2008)

¹⁰⁹ U.S. Constitution, art. 1 and 2.

athers, Ben-Gurion firmly believed in the tradition of the military being subordinate to the civilian government.¹¹⁰ During his tenure as both prime minister and defense minister, Ben-Gurion ensured the subordination of the military to the civilian government. The one fault that the Israeli case study shows is that when the subordination of the military to the civilian government was not originally written down. It was not until 1976 when the Knesset passed the Basic Law: The Army that the military was officially subordinated to the civilian government.¹¹¹ By the time the Knesset passed the law officially subordinating the military to the civilian government, the military had already gained a political foothold in many areas. The government of Israel continually fights the level of influence the military has on politics today.

These case studies show two different approaches to subordinating the military to the civilian government through written documents. Even though the period in which these formal documents were established is different, it is important to note that the civilian government found it necessary to establish written law to ensure the military was subordinate to the civilians. These case studies show the importance of establishing written documents that subordinate the military to the civilian government. Having written documents that subordinate the military to the civilian government eliminates the potential for misunderstanding the role of the military within the nation. The written documents should also delineate the mission and purpose of the military in relation to the civilian government.

Professionalism of the Military

Both case studies support the criteria that some degree of professionalism is required of militaries in democracies and will affect civil-military relations. Huntington and Janowitz discuss the professionalism of the military as a cornerstone for civil-military relations in democracies. Huntington uses three characteristics to describe professionalism these are responsibility,

¹¹⁰ Lebel, 11.

¹¹¹ Lebel, 1.

expertise, corporateness. Both the United States and Israel showed that professionalism is important in civil-military relations. The United States case study shows that the military started to professionalize in the late 1600s early 1700s. Some of the factors that assisted in the transition are excellent leaders emerged from the War of 1812, the army received a permanent mission: to prepare for war, and West Point became a school that provided a cohesive body of officers.¹¹² Formal education for military officers became permanent with the establishment of the United States Military Academy on 16 March 1802. Education brought the United States military one step closer to being a fully professional military. The military finally received a reason for full-time existence that went beyond the standard militia when it received the permanent mission to prepare for war. The establishment of West Point also instilled the sense of corporateness among the military officers by providing a sense of camaraderie to those officers who graduated from the Military Academy.

The Israel case study shows that for Israel, the concept of a professional military is a source of pride for its people. The professionalism of the IDF has roots back to prior to the nations declaration of independence. Almost 10% of Israeli citizens serve in the military on either active duty or in the reserves. The concept of professionalism is apparent in every aspect of Israeli life, from the everyday activities of its citizens to how the civilian government interacts with the military. All Israelis see their military as a professional force that from the beginning has been essential to the survival of the nation. With only two peace treaties ever signed, Israel finds itself constantly being utilized to provide security for the nation. The corporateness of the officer corps stems from the fact that selection into the officer ranks is based upon meeting the qualifications needed by the IDF. Once selected into the officer corps, officers of the IDF receive professional education through the National Defense College.

¹¹² Moten, 104.

Both case studies show that the development of professionalism is a progressive process that is achieved over time. The development of the professional officer corps in both cases has roots back prior to the establishment of the nation. The support for a professional military stems from the people and the civilian government. The level of professionalism influences the relationship between the civilian government and the military. A more professional officer corps usually means a more streamlined civil-military relationship. The professionalism of the military determines how the military interacts with the civilian government. A professional officer corps increases the chance that the military and the civilian government will function in a manner that is productive to the security of the nation.

Dialogue During War and Peace

In relation to the interaction between the civilian government and the military being a different during peacetime and wartime, both cases show that civil-military relations change dependent upon war and peace. The United States fought in four major wars between and including the American Revolution and the Civil War. The United States was involved in more than twenty conflicts prior to the Civil War.¹¹³ The most notable example for the United States during this time period was that of President Lincoln and his interactions with the generals of the army. President Lincoln hired and fired general officer until he found one that would meet the needs he saw as important to achieving his strategic vision. Another example is General Wayne in the Northwest Indian wars when he was specifically told by the civilian government when and where to move supplies and men.¹¹⁴ This example shows how much more the civilian government becomes involved during wartime versus peace. In peace the military was often neglected.

¹¹³ <http://www.usahistory.com/frames.htm> (accessed on September 26 2008)

¹¹⁴ Kohn, *Eagle and Sword*, 153-154.

In the case of Israel the nation has been at war since its founding. Israel has only signed two peace treaties since its formation, once with Egypt that was signed in 1979, and a peace treaty with Jordan in 1994. In the Israel case study, the civilian government is much more active in the day-to-day activities of the military in times of relative peace. In times of open conflict, the civilian government takes a much more hands-off approach to military operations so long as the military did not stray from the strategic goals agreed upon by the civilian government. One exception to this was defense Minister Dayan who became extremely active in the activities of the military during its operations.¹¹⁵ Normally, this hands-off approach appears to come as a result of the appreciation the civilian government has for the expertise and professionalism of the military.

Both case studies show a difference in the dialogue between times of peace and war. They are, however, the exact opposite of one another. In the United States, the civilian government often neglected the military during times of peace, in Israel there is more interactions between the civilian government and the military. During times of war, the United States government interacts significantly more with the military, whereas in Israel, the civilian government appears to give a free reign to the military. Even though these case studies show an interaction between the civilian and military that is opposite one another, they also show that there will be a difference in how the civilian government and the military act during times of war and times of peace. As a nation develops it must be aware that there will be a difference in its civil-military relations based upon the type of environment it is in.

Working or Shirking

The criterion that the military will work or shirk based upon how divergent its views are compared to the views of the civilian government is supported by both case studies. During the early years of the United States, it was common for the officers to try and alter the plans the

¹¹⁵ Peri, *Between Battles and Ballots*, 164.

civilian government had set forth in order to achieve their own agendas. A prime example is that of the Newburgh Conspiracy. Here the officers attempt to pressure Congress into paying back wages and providing for a promised pension. These types of events appeared to happen as often as not.

The Israel case study shows how individual officers and the military as an institution can either work or shirk based upon how the military views the orders given by the civilian government. If it is perceived by the military that the civilians are minimizing their importance then the military officers will tend to shirk. One example of the military shirking is when the military officers went to the press over the disagreement of the Clinton plan in December 2000.¹¹⁶ Here the military officers are using the press as an outlet to show their discontent with the civilian government's plan. The second part of the military's willingness to work or shirk is when the military as an institution sees limits established by the civilian government as a threat to its normal bureaucratic operations. The military shirks most noticeably when the civilian government tries to limit the amount of influence the military has on the areas of budgeting for the military, research & development, and procurement of equipment and resources.¹¹⁷

The tendency for the military to work or shirk is based upon the amount of supervision from the civilian government and the potential for punishment if caught shirking. The civilian government must be actively involved in what the military does. This interaction, however, must not be so intrusive as to limit the military's ability to perform its duties. A developing democracy must determine the appropriate balance of oversight so that the military does what the civilian government wants it to do, but does not interfere in the overall effectiveness of the military. Developing the appropriate amount of oversight will be a continually evolving process. The civilian government must remain diligent in its oversight of the military, but not intrusive to the point of diminishing the military's effectiveness.

¹¹⁶ Peri, *Generals in the Cabinet Room*, 105.

¹¹⁷ Ben Meir, 89.

All of the criteria that were derived from the studies of Huntington, Janowitz, Cohen, and Feaver are supported by the case studies. The concept of the founding document set the baseline for civilian control over the military and the degree of professionalism of the military will affect civil-military relations appear to be almost automatic requirements. The criterion of the dialogue that takes place during war and peace shows two completely opposite possibilities. The work-shirk attitude of the military appears to be affected by the type of governmental style and development of personal relationships and the environment that the nation is in. Figure two shows how each case study supports the four criteria.

Criteria / Case Study	Civilian control over the military	Professionalism of the military	Difference between peacetime and wartime civil-military relations	Work or shirk
United States	Constitution set the baseline for initial control over the military; separation of powers between executive and legislative branches to ensure no one person could have complete control over the military; most feared abuse of the military machine	Professionalism develops initially with the responsibility of defending the nation followed by the beginnings of corporateness and cemented with the establishment of the United States Military Academy	In peacetime the military is often neglected and drawn down with little interaction from the civilian government. During wartime the civilian government maintains significant oversight on the training, movement and selection of officers who control the military	The military would shirk when it felt the civilian government was not taking into consideration the needs of the military and its officers
Israel	Defense Army of Israel Ordinance No. 4 established the IDF; Ben-Gurion by force of will ensure the military was subordinate to the civilian government; in 1976 the Basic Law: the Army was signed to formally subordinate the military to the civilian government in writing	Professionalism is rooted in the pre-nation military with a mission to defend the Jews, expands with the creation of formal education, and becomes corporate through the selection of a select few to make up the core officer group	In peacetime the civilian government maintains more oversight in the training and supplying of the military; during times of war the civilian government often maintains a relatively hands off approach so long as the military works within the boundaries of strategic guidance. This is opposite of the interactions in the United States	The military will work so long as the desires of the military are not extremely divergent with that of the civilian government. Shirk happens when the military did not agree with the actions of the civilian government

Figure 2

From the review of the theories and applying the criteria identified to the two case studies it becomes apparent that democracies require a level of civil control over the military and that the

founding document set the baseline for civilian control over the military. The amount and type of control will vary from nation to nation dependent upon the history and governmental structure. Both Huntington's and Janowitz's work support the idea that militaries in democracies are professional and that the degree of professionalism of the military will affect civil-military relations. A professional military is supported with concept that militaries become professional through expertise, responsibility, and corporateness of the officer corps. This is achieved through educational institutions and training of the officer corps.

The third criterion of a difference between peacetime and wartime civil-military relations finds its basis in Cohen's work. He delineates a difference in the interaction of the senior military officers and the senior civilian politicians. The last criterion affects the operational level of civil-military relations in that it discusses how the civilian government and the military interact with one another. The military will "work" or "shirk" based upon how divergent their views are compared to the views of the civilian government. Feaver discusses the relationship between the civilian government and the military based upon the principal-agent framework. The agent theory discusses how the military will test the left and right limits that the civilian government places on it. Both case studies used in the paper examined some aspect of these criteria.

These four generalizations can be used to assist newly emerging democracies in developing their civil-military relations. By understanding that these criteria apply to all democratic nations, it would allow newly emerging democracies the chance to learn from others' mistakes and to improve upon the overall process of developing functioning civil-military relations. Each nation will have its own style of civil-military relations based upon its location, the type of government established and the amount of civil control desired. Democracies are emerging at an increasingly rapid pace. As a mature democracy, it is beneficial for the United States to understand areas in which it can mentor these newly emerging democracies.

Understanding and developing civil-military relations in a democracy is an ever-changing environment. As democracies mature, so too will their civil-military relations. To ignore civil-

military relations is to invite in the potential for major conflict between the civilian government and the military. Civil-military relations require continual reassessment and evaluation. This study is relevant to anyone who will be working with newly emerging democracies. There are a number of organizations that will benefit from this study. These organizations include but are not limited to the Multi National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I), the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), all Unified Combatant Commands, and the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). These organizations are currently in the fight, shaping the fight, and preparing for the future respectively.

The two organizations involved in the current fight are MNSTC-I and CSTC-A. Both organizations are in a position to influence the professionalism of the security forces currently being established in both Iraq and Afghanistan. By assisting in the development of the professionalism of the security forces these organizations help to foster a key area of civil-military relations. If not already in existence, MNSTC-I and CSTC-A are in positions where they can influence and assist in developing amendments to the existing constitutions that will formally subordinate the military to the civilian government. They are also in a position to influence the development of the working relationship between the civilian government and the military. The Unified Combatant Commands (UCC) can also use this document when dealing with not only newly emerging democracies but also consolidating and mature democracies. Even as a mature democracy the United States continues to re-evaluate and assess its civil-military relations. The UCCs are in positions where they may assist democracies in identifying areas in which civil-military relations can improve and to provide assistance and advice as needed. S/RCS is also in a position to help newly emerging democracies establish formal documents for the subordination of the military to the civilian government. Having the responsibility for the reconstruction and stabilization of societies puts the S/RCS in the unique position to help in the establishment of founding documents for nations. These founding documents set the baseline for where civil-

military relations. These are but a few of the organizations that may benefit from the findings of this study. The study of civil-military relations has applications for many organizations and governmental agencies. The identification of areas in which civil-military relations may be influenced becomes increasing important in today's world.

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